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4 March 1953

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED], EA/DCI

SUBJECT : Item to be discussed at PSB Luncheon Meeting,  
5 March 1953

1. Attached is a memorandum given to CIA by the Bureau of German Affairs of the State Department, through a representative of the Eastern European Division of the Clandestine Services Staff who attends the Bureau's weekly staff meetings. We are advised that General Smith will raise the question which is the subject of a memorandum at the PSB Luncheon meeting on 5 March 1953.

2. The State Department paper is a revival of a plan which was originally brought to Mr. Allen Dulles' attention in August and September, 1952, at the urging of the PSB Staff and which was the subject of at least one meeting with [REDACTED] and others of the PSB staff. I understand the plan was dropped at the request of the State Department at that time.

3. Briefly, the plan proposes the defection of 50,000 to 100,000 male youths of military age by use of indirect and covert means for encouraging defection. The hoped-for result of this program is to reduce the pools of military and economic manpower in East Germany. The plan, in effect, is an attempt to increase the percentage of military-age youth in the current flow of East German refugees and to increase the absolute flow of refugees which has recently been reported to be several thousand per day. Current U.S. projects for the reception and care of escapees do not cover East Germans, although the State Department is now considering a possible U.S. program for East German care and welfare. It is the opinion of the CIA staff that some method of integration of the refugees into the West German population should be devised before CIA is asked to encourage defection of this group.

4. The present proposal differs from that put forward in September in two respects:

a. The PSB member agencies are now being asked to approve only the principle of encouraging additional male youths to defect from East Germany; if approval of the principle is given it is my understanding that the State Department will endeavor to secure the necessary cooperation of the German Federal Republic and the concurrence of the British and French in any contemplated implementing measures.

b. The program contemplates exclusive use of covert means for encouraging defection.

5. The Eastern European Division of the Clandestine Services has examined the proposal and is inclined to doubt that it will have the desired effect, even assuming attainment of the optimum volume of 100,000 youth

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refugees. The Division raises the following considerations which militate against the principle of the proposal:

- a. It is extremely unlikely that the defection of 50,000 to 100,000 out of the estimated total of 1,400,000 youths of military age (16-27) would present East German authorities with a serious manpower problem.
- b. The program, even if successful, would have only short term and limited capability for propaganda exploitation, since a good flow of refugees is already in existence. More important, a successful defection program would serve to eliminate anti-Communist elements from East Germany and thereby weaken the existing and potential East German resistance movement.
- c. Since there is no manpower shortage in West Germany, there is no need for defected East German personnel as recruits in the West German military force. Furthermore, West German military recruitment of East German defectors would provide Communist authorities with an opportunity of penetrating the West German military force.
- d. Assimilation of large numbers of East German defectors and refugees is already difficult in West Germany and an attempt to add the planned number to the existing flow might cause disillusionment among defected East Germans and aggravate West German antagonisms in a way that could be effectively exploited in Communist propaganda.
- e. Encouragement of Western-oriented East Germans to remain in East Germany would help maintain an active resistance movement in East Germany and would constitute both a strategic military asset for the West and a psychological and military liability for the Soviet Union.

6. While inclined to doubt the desirability of the plan, the Eastern European Division can carry out a covert campaign with its existing assets directed at this target group which might have the desired effect of increasing the flow of military age youth. The Eastern European Division is not, however, in a position to expand its present capabilities and would have to eliminate some current operations to accommodate this proposal.

7. We have been advised by cable from the German Mission that, in a recent Ad Hoc meeting attended by RIGOO (including the then Acting U.S. High Commissioner Samuel Reber) [REDACTED] and CIA representatives, it was decided not to encourage defection from Eastern Germany other than defection in place.

8. It is recommended that, if requested, DCI should indicate his opinion that further consideration of this proposal be made dependent upon adequate evidence that the plan for the defection of 50,000 to 100,000

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youth will have the results claimed for it; i.e., a significant adverse affect upon the East German economic and military manpower pool without an equally adverse affect within the Federal Republic.



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